Numbers

Figures converted from HKD at historical FX rates — see fx_rates.json for the rate table. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

The Numbers

Blue Moon trades where it does because the market can't yet tell whether the 2024 operating loss was a one-shot channel reset or a structural repricing of what a #1 Chinese consumer brand is worth once Douyin and Tmall set the cost of attention. The single metric most likely to rerate or derate this stock is selling & distribution expense as a percent of revenue — it went from 29% (FY2020) to 59% (FY2024) and pulled back to 53% (FY2025). If H1 FY2026 prints below 50%, the balance sheet (zero debt, $478M net cash) and the 60% gross margin become a re-rating cocktail. If it doesn't, the stock is a melting ice cube with a five-year runway.

Snapshot

Price ($) — 2026-04-17

0.38

Market Cap ($M)

2,210

Revenue FY2025 ($M)

1,080

Quality Score (/100)

Fair Value ($, base)

0.39

Zero debt, $478M of net cash, and a market cap of $2.21B means nearly a quarter of the market cap is just the cash on the balance sheet. Enterprise value is roughly $1.73B on $1.08B of sales — an EV/Sales of 1.6x for a brand that posts 60% gross margins.

Quality Scorecard

**Is this a well-run business that will still be around in 10 years?** The balance sheet says yes — no debt, $478M cash, Altman Z-score of 7.0 (safe zone is anything above 3.0). The P&L says the jury is still out — two consecutive years of operating losses after a decade of 25%+ margins. Predictability is low because the cost structure has repriced underneath management's feet.

No Results

The composite quality score (42/100) is an average of a great balance sheet and a poor income statement. Readers familiar with branded-consumer frameworks will notice the shape: this is what Colgate or Church & Dwight would look like if they had to retire their CPG playbook on one market and rebuild distribution from scratch.

Revenue & Earnings Power — The Six-Year View

Revenue has grown from $902M to $1.08B over six years — a 3.7% annual rate that understates the story. What actually happened: the company defended volume at any operating-margin cost. The left-hand chart shows operating income collapsed from $225M to minus $46M while revenue went up. The right-hand chart explains why: gross margin stayed flat at ~60%, but operating margin dropped 29 points. Everything that went wrong lives between gross profit and operating profit — in selling & distribution.

The Only Chart That Matters — S&D Ratio

**Every point on this line is about $11M of annual operating profit.** S&D at 53% of revenue costs the company ~$578M a year. At FY2020's 29% ratio it would have cost ~$310M. The $270M gap is the entire swing between a 25% operating-margin business and a loss-making one. Watch this line — it is the single best leading indicator for FY2026 earnings.

Revenue Composition — Concentrated, Channel-Dependent

Fabric care is 88% of revenue and has barely moved in five years. Personal hygiene is up 13% in FY2025 but still only 7% of mix. Online revenue peaked in FY2024 at $657M (60% of sales) and retreated 2.5% in FY2025 as management pulled back from loss-making promotional spend. That offline/online balance around 60/40 is the equilibrium the next P&L turns on.

Cash Conversion & the IPO War Chest

The filings don't publish a line-item cash flow statement, but the change-in-cash tells the story cleanly: in four of the last five years the company burned cash, and total cash is down two-thirds from the IPO high of $1.41B. FY2023 lost $430M of cash against a $42M reported profit — the gap is roughly the $310M special dividend paid that year. FY2024 looked better only because trade receivables fell and the company stopped paying specials. The runway math: at the FY2025 cash outflow of $207M (operating loss plus ~$116M dividend), the company has about 2.5 years before the ordinary dividend has to be cut.

Balance Sheet Health

Total liabilities are trade payables, tax accruals, and lease obligations — no bank borrowings, no bonds. Equity has fallen from $1.51B to $966M through a combination of operating losses, buybacks, and dividends. The Altman Z-score of 7.0 is deep in the safe zone; the distress risk on this name is effectively zero for the next three to four years. That is the reason the stock hasn't been cut in half again.

Valuation — The Six-Year Self-Comparison

Blue Moon only listed in December 2020, so the twenty-year history rule collapses to a six-year self-comparison — which happens to span the full life of the public company. The IPO froth of FY2020 (12.7x sales, 67x earnings) was never rational; strip it out and the useful baseline is FY2021–FY2025. Current P/S at 2.05x is meaningfully below the five-year post-IPO average of 3.02x. Current P/B at 2.29x is right at the post-IPO average. Trailing P/E is undefined (negative earnings) and forward P/E depends on whether you believe FY2026 is a profit year.

Current P/S

2.05

▲ 3.02 5y avg

5y low P/S (FY2023)

1.59

Current P/B

2.29

▲ 2.32 5y avg

The Stock's Journey — IPO to Today

From the IPO-era peak near $2.19 the stock is down about 83%. The FY2023 bottom at roughly $0.28 came as the first operating-margin compression showed up; the FY2024 recovery to $0.56 priced in a "channel reset" story; the subsequent slide to $0.38 reflects the market's reduced confidence that S&D can get back below 50%. The shape is a classic post-IPO de-rating plus cyclical operating-margin correction — not a capital-structure scare.

Peer Comparison

No Results

Blue Moon trades at the lowest P/S of the group (2.05x vs peer average 3.46x) but also posts the lowest operating margin (-4.2% vs peer range 16–27%). The peer discount is earned: the market is right that this is not yet a Colgate or P&G on earnings quality. The question is whether the gross-margin profile (59.7%, among the highest in the group) plus the balance sheet (zero debt, a rarity in this sector) justify a closer P/S once operating margin stabilizes at the 8–12% this business demonstrated in 2020–2022. Colgate's extreme P/B is a quirk of a share-buyback-driven thin equity base; ignore it when assessing Blue Moon.

Fair Value — Three Scenarios

No Results

At $0.38 the stock is effectively at the base case. The distribution is asymmetric up (the bull case requires only that S&D return to FY2022 levels — a normal rather than heroic assumption) but the base case is not supportive enough to own for capital appreciation alone. The incremental investor needs to take a view on whether FY2025's S&D discipline continues.

Bottom Line

What the numbers confirm: the balance sheet is pristine ($478M net cash, no debt, Altman Z of 7.0) and brand-level economics are intact (60% gross margin, unmoved through six years of channel chaos). What the numbers contradict: the narrative that this is a broken business. It isn't — operating income has been destroyed at a level entirely above gross profit, which means fixing it is a cost-discipline problem, not a pricing-power problem. What to watch next quarter: the H1 FY2026 S&D ratio. Below 50% changes the base case; above 55% triggers a rethink of whether management can resist the Tmall/Douyin promotional cycle at all. Everything else — volume growth, product mix, even the dividend — is downstream of that one line.